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The Council-of- Governments Approach
To Governmental Fragmentation
Louis F. Comus, Jr.*
I. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENTAL FRAGMENTATION-A
"PROBLEM"?
A. The Popular View
Much of the current literature in the field of metropolitan
government either sets forth examples of governmental difficulties and
inefficiencies which result from the urbanization of our population or
merely assumes that such difficulties exist. In either case the
prescription usually involves some sort of "metropolitanization" of
urban governmental structure. Since such prescriptions are aimed
either at metropolitan difficulties in general or at particular
inefficiencies, it is useful to consider some of the more frequent
complaints.
One factor often cited as contributing to various urban ills is the
archaic governmental structure of many county governments in
metropolitan areas.1 Counties which were originally set up merely as
localized agents of the state governments are not equipped to handle
many of the functions required when the county includes urbanized
areas, either incorporated or unincorporated. Thus, functions usually
considered to be duties of the local or municipal government either
are not undertaken for the county residents or are handled on an ad
hoc basis by the county government in connection with other
governmental units. This type of inadequate handling of governmental
functions in various locales of the metropolitan area can contribute
substantially to the urban "problem."
Shifting from the problem of inadequate local governmental
services to the more common situation in which governmental services
are provided by a municipality or special service district, the problems
seem to stem from fragmentation of the governmental structure.
* Member of the New York Bar; associate with the firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, New
York, New York.
1. Report of Committee on Inter-Municipal Cooperation, 28 NI MLO MUN. L. REv. 164,
174-75 (1965); Wood, The New Metropolis, in DEMOCRACY IN URBAN AMERICA (0. Williams &
C. Press ed. 1961).
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Arising from the gradual growing together of many smaller units
originally planned as autonomous municipalities, this
"fractionalization" of governmental duties is seen as contributing to
the breakdown of local government in metropolitan areas, or to the
diminution of popular control over local government. Loss of control
results when each citizen in a given area is subject to the exercise of
governmental functions and the provision of governmental services by
several different units, usually with differing boundaries, thus diluting
and diffusing the citizen's efforts and interest in his government.
Closely akin to this problem is the possibility that if requisite
functions are not undertaken locally, they will be taken over by the
state, again removing local government from local control.
One of the most frequently mentioned difficulties with
governmental fragmentation is the resultant piecemeal approach to
various projects which are area-wide in impact and which thus
transcend the various units which attempt to undertake them.
Whenever governmental proliferation results in the undertaking of
similar services by several different units in the same general area,
there will be an overlapping of responsibilities by units which are not
capable of handling the whole job or even a significant part of it.
Needs for services do not often respect geographical boundary lines,
and when a special service district is created to meet a specific need
for a small locality, that special district may also disregard other
governmental boundary lines, thus creating an overlapping of
responsibilities. Moreover, where services and functions do not
actually overlap, they are usually duplicated many times throughout
the metropolitan area, as where each of the many municipalities in the
area levies and assesses its own property tax. Finally, in addition to
the inadequacies resulting from proliferation, the proliferation itself is
often cited as a problem, consisting of continuous complication of an
already highly complicated governmental structure. The whole
complex of proliferation-oriented problems generally involves such
specific items as: apportioning a limited common resource (water
supply); non-uniform and occasionally subnormal social standards in
some of the units; incompatible land use restrictions for contiguous
properties in different jurisdictions; non-coordination of street
planning and construction; non-coordination of related public
programs (various licensing programs and enforcement procedures);
and widely divergent taxation schemes.
Another serious problem of urbanization-proliferation is rural-to-
urban and urban-to-suburban migration. The movement of prosperous
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citizens from the core city to the suburbs and their replacement by
unassimilated migrants to the core city has usually resulted in a rather
serious urban-suburban split along economic, social and racial lines. In
many instances this causes a loss of awareness of core city problems
by suburban residents and a consequent divergence of interests along
core city-suburban geographical lines. Politics tend to become
bifurcated in the same manner, with the core city becoming generally
Democratic and the suburbs usually Republican, again contributing to
the cleavage between the two types of governmental units.
Overlying all the urban-suburban differences and the proliferation
problems are myriad inequalities and inequities in governmental
services, functions and powers. Use of services becomes divorced from
payment for such use when the urban worker resides in the suburbs.
Services and conveniences provided and completely paid for by the
core city "spill over" their benefits to the suburbs. Conversely, if the
city has its own income tax, which is paid by the suburban dweller
but is used for various city welfare programs rather than fiscal
services, the suburban citizen is paying for something he is not
getting. Of course, whenever there are many different units of
government supplying a similar service to different populations, there
is likely to be substantial inequality in the level of such services
among the several municipalities. 2 While this enumeration of
inequalities is quite superficial and incomplete, it does indicate that
such inequities are problems which plague all of our metropolitan
areas.
B. The Banfield Query
Contrasted to the popular view that governmental fragmentation
in metropolitan areas is bad per se are occasional dissents suggesting
that there may be positive values in fragmentation which would be
sacrificed in a complete consolidation of the metropolitan area.
Edward C. Banfield, a strong advocate of this position, criticizes the
"strong bias toward simplicity, uniformity, and symmetry of
structure," 3 suggesting that values such as community independence,
sociability and status should be weighed against advantages of
consolidation. While Banfield does cite certain definite advantages to
2. Grant, Trends in Urban Government and Administration, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
38, 46 (1960).
3. Banfield & Grodzins, Limitations of Metropolitan Reorganization, in DEMOCRACY IN
URBAN AMERICA 171, 176 (0. Williams & C. Press ed. 196 1).
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some regionalism in governmental administration, he believes that the
bigness of any consolidation will probably remove the government
further from the governed.
The suggestion that there may be virtue in governmental
fragmentation is supported by the fact that a growing concept of
"community," found in suburban communities, may be leading
toward more homogeniety, especially along job lines. Moreover, the
creation of neighborhoods of internal cohesion is a basic goal of
urban planners' and has become a requirement under the federal
government's urban renewal programs.5 Finally, even those who
strongly advocate centralization and consolidation of functions in the
metropolitan area are beginning to realize the desirability of keeping
governmental units small and close to the citizen where this can be
done pursuant to a coordinated plan for the whole metropolitan area.
This is an avowed purpose of the President's Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations.'
C. Mere Efficiency
Efficiency in the performance of governmental functions is
usually discussed as a peripheral attribute of almost any plan for
metropolitan consolidation or coordination, but too often this factor
is largely ignored in favor of the more "political" aspects of
fragmentation. Thus, when we discuss the problem of duplication of
efforts, the emphasis is often on the effort itself, rather than on the
costs of that effort. Stated somewhat differently, the emphasis seems
to lie upon the potential conflict between two officials or offices which
perform the same function in different areas, or on the citizen
confusion which arises from, subjection to overlapping jurisdictions,
rather than on the economic inefficiency of proliferation.
There are some obvious efficiencies to be realized in the
coordination of multiplicity of efforts. These efficiencies need not find
their justification in the complicated concepts of closeness of
government to governed, of bifurcated politics, or of other problems.
In other words, the economic costs of wasted efforts, when viewed on
the larger metropolitan scale, would seem to justify "problem" status
on their own.
4. Babcock & Bosselman, Citizen Participation: A Suburban Suggestion for the Central
City, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 220, 228-231 (1967).
5. Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, § 103(a)(2), 42
U.S.C. § 3303(a)(2) (Supp. 1967).




To illustrate this argument, assume that in Central City the tax
collection activities require most of the working time of a supervisor,
an accountant, an attorney, and several secretaries. This pattern is
duplicated, with minor adjustments according to work load, in the
several adjacent suburbs, in area school districts, in other special
service districts, and in any county governments included in the
metropolitan area. It seems clear that if the tax collection activities of
all area governmental units and special districts were consolidated,
some personnel could be eliminated, especially at the supervisory level,
resulting in a dollar savings to the area as a whole. Add to this the
potential effects of automation, made more economically feasible by
the increase in work, and the dollar savings is increased.
Economic inefficiency is implicit in any discussion of the
problems of duplication of efforts and overlapping of functions. But
in most discussions of duplication and overlapping, the conclusion is
merely that there. is waste, without more. What is of primary
significance in this particular type of inefficiency is the inherent
misallocation of financial resources at the metropolitan level. Every
dollar which is inefficiently used in duplication of functions cannot be
used for other needed metropolitan services which would signficantly
benefit the entire metropolitan area as well as each constituent
governmental entity.
It should be noted that efficiency in itself need not necessarily be
deemed an overriding consideration, but should rather be placed in the
balance along with the other arguments for coordination of
metropolitan services. It is quite possible that the interests of
neighborhood solidarity and homogeniety will still outweigh, or at
least temper, the arguments for consolidation. However, recent
developments in our cities suggest that these latter considerations can
be sacrificed if such sacrifice will permit the allocation of additional
funds to explosive problem areas, while somewhat alleviating the
already prohibitive tax burdens upon all the citizens.
II. THE NATURE OF A COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS
A. Structure
1. Essential Form.-In order for a Council of Governments
(COG) to be eligible for planning grants under the Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1965, 7 it must meet specific standards set
7. 40 U.S.C. § 461(g) (Supp. 1967).
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forth by the Housing and Home Financing Agency," predecessor to
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD):
(1) Voting members of the organization must be, for the most part, elected
officials; (2) Members must represent about 90 per cent of the aggregate
population of the area encompassed by the organization; (3) The organization
must be a corporation or other legal entity established pursuant to local law or
interstate compact, or must have the membership of each participating
jurisdiction authorized by a resolution of the governing body of that jurisdiction,
or must otherwise demonstrate that it has official standing in the area; (4) The
organization must have a competent professional, technical and administrative
staff sufficient to carry out its proposed activities; and (5) The organization must
be able to assure that non-federal funds to match the grant will be provided.
Although this form is not essential to the COG concept and was not
followed exactly in the COGs which were founded prior to the HUD
requirements, it is assumed herein that COGs will conform to the
specifications set forth in the Planning Agency Letter in order to take
full advantage of the two-thirds matching grant from the federal
government.
Within the framework of the HUD specifications, a COG is
usually comprised of units of general government' in an area in which
the citizens share common metropolitan interests.'" Each county and
municipality is represented on the Council" which meets
semiannually. An executive committee, constituted from among the
members of the Council by vote of the Council, carries on the COG
functions between semiannual Council meetings. The major units of
government in both the counties and the central city are usually
represented on the executive committee. In addition, most COGs
appoint standing committees from among their members for
continuing study of the various specific areawide problems." The
8. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, METROPOLITAN
COUNCILS OF GOVERNMENTS 60 (Housing & Home Finance Agency, Planning Agency Letter
No. 50, 1966).
9. This criterion excludes special districts from voting membership. However, where a
given project would involve the functions of a special district, or of several special districts, the
cooperation of such districts should be sought (as where the COG undertakes water pollution
control projects).
10. For example, the communities in the eight-county area around Nashville, Tennessee,
were found to have interests in common regarding the growth of this region. The geography of
the area apparently oriented communities in the eight counties toward the Nashville
metropolitan area rather than toward any other population center or toward rural detachment.
II. Usually, each unit has one representative, as in Nashville, Dallas, St. Louis and
Philadelphia. However, the Seattle organization includes as participating members all the county
commissioners of participating counties and three members from each participating
municipality. PUGET SOUND GOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE-A DESCRIPTION I (1968).
12. For example, the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments maintains five
standing policy committees: Health and Welfare; Environmental Health; Land Use; Public
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functions of the two-tier organization are coordinated by a
professional staff, headed by an executive director.1
3
The COGs, of course, have no "power" in the sense of their
being able to formulate policies which will be enforceable upon the
various governmental units. COGs are completely voluntary
organizations with each member having an effective veto on any
subject, at least insofar as that subject may affect that member's
municipality. However, COGs may find enforcement potential in the
Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966,
which provides that any federal grants for federal open-space projects
and other federally assisted development projects must be approved by
an "areawide [planning] agency."' 4 The area planning agency is
defined so as to suggest that the draftsmen of the statute had COGs
in mind for this requirement.
2. Comparison with Similar Coordination Concepts.-The
Council of Governments concept can be more easily illustrated and its
value more readily assessed if it is compared with other available
forms of governmental devices aimed at coordination of efforts in
metropolitan areas. 15
(a) Use of Extraterritorial Powers.-The Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (hereinafter ACIR)
defines extraterritorial powers as "powers which a city exercises
outside its ordinary territorial limits to regulate activity there or to
assist in providing services to its citizens within its own boundaries.""
To be effective this method of arresting helter-skelter development of
the urban fringe requires statutory authorization by the state. Most
states currently authorize at least limited extraterritorial jurisdiction
by central cities, usually for essential health services such as water
supply, garbage dumps, and sewage disposal and treatment. In
Safety; and the Transportation Planning Board. There are, in addition, fourteen technical
advisory committees to counsel the above standing policy committees, such as the Air Pollution
Advisory Board of the Air Pollution Technical Evaluation Committee. METROPOLITAN
WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS, HERE, Now. . . AND TOMORROW 32 (1968-1969).
13. Philadelphia has a three-tier COG, including a "conference" with members from all
governmental units, a "council" including the members from all cities of population in excess of
25,000, and the executive board. Letter from Fred Eibell, Administrative Assistant to the
Executive Director, Regional Conference of Elected Officials, April 22, 1968.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 3334(a) (Supp. 1967).
15. The metropolitan coordination concepts listed here are derived from the ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL R8LATIONS, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO
GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS (1962) [hereinafter cited as ACIR,
ALTERNATIVES].
16. Id. at 20.
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addition, some thirty states have granted cities power to exercise
planning, zoning and subdivision controls outside their territorial
boundaries. 7 Of course, extraterritorial powers are limited to
unincorporated areas of the fringe and are completely impotent within
suburban municipalities where many of the coordination problems
arise.
While this method of coordination can certainly prevent
completely uncontrolled development outside the central city, the
existence of this power may also promote hasty incorporation in the
outlying areas, thus frustrating evenly planned development.
Moreover, if the central city is not careful in its extraterritorial
statesmanship, it may create friction which will retard the
development of more comprehensive coordination. The ACIR
recommends wide use of extraterritorial power, but further
recommends that residents of the unincorporated areas be given a
voice in the exercise of this power.
A COG has one distinct advantage over extraterritorial
jurisdiction. The COG "jurisdiction" is areawide, including more
territory than could be covered by extraterritorial powers, thus
permitting increased coordination within its sphere of influence. Since
COGs include members from incorporated areas of the region, the
suburban municipalities are included in the COG deliberations.
However, since COGs have little or no effective power, their decisions
cannot be enforced as can exercises of the power jurisdiction.
(b) Intergovernmental Agreements.-This coordination
concept is best illustrated by the Lakewood Plan or its variations,
whereby each governmental unit contracts either with the county or
with other municipalities for the performance of services within its
boundaries. 8 Agreements under this plan may include just about any
city service or activity, such as the provision of water supply or
sewage service, joint purchasing, or reciprocal fire protection
activities. This type of cooperation also requires state statutory
approval, and many states have granted such approval." Advantages
of this method of coordination include broadening of the geographic
base for planning and administering governmental services, providing
economies of scale in projects such as sewage disposal which require a
17. Id. at 21.
18. Will, Another Look at Lakewood, in READINGS IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
328 (Zimmerman ed. 1964).
19. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6500-13 (1966); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 715.02
(Baldwin 1964); TENN. CODE ANN. § 5-113 (1955).
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large capital outlay, and avoiding the creation of multiple special
districts and the consequent overlapping and duplication of
functions. These arrangements also have high political feasibility since
they require a minimum of voter approval. However, such agreements
are useful only when each community involved has vital interest in the
service provided. Therefore, the agreements will not usually cover a
whole metropolitan area, but will be limited to those sections of the
area where the need for the particular service is felt. This could
impede comprehensive planning and development for the entire region.
The fact that each municipality is a vital participant gives any unit an
effective veto in that it can withdraw from the agreement, subject to
contract enforcement procedures in the courts. Moreover, although
such agreements have the effect of preventing the creation of special
districts within the region, they are reported to have encouraged
increased incorporation in California.0
COGs have many characteristics in common with the
intergovernmental agreement form of cooperation. The COG also
broadens the geographic base of influence in the region, but the
expansion is limited presently to planning functions. However it seems
possible, especially with the infusion of federal grants through the
1965 Housing Act, that COGs could undertake some of the
governmental services noted above on an areawide basis and provide
them on a contractual basis to constituent municipalities, just as
counties do under present Lakewood Plans. 21 Joint projects of this
nature could achieve economies of scale and avoidance of multiple
special service districts as in the existing intergovernmental agreement
programs. COGs would have the added advantage of extending the
geographic base to the whole metropolitan region, rather than merely
to isolated locales throughout a metropolitan area, and would result
in more comprehensive coordination of planning efforts. Under the
COG concept, each community has an effective veto which can be
exercised by a course of non-cooperation. A COG does not have the
enforcement potential of legal contracts, unless, as noted above, it
employs the contractual approach. Moreover, there is no reason for a
COG to foster the creation of more municipalities, since the COG is
completely voluntary and may contract with unincorporated areas
20. ACIR, ALTERNATIVES 31.
21. There is precedent for such provision of services, especially in the planning functions
performed in most existing COGs, both in the sense of coordination of planning efforts in the
region and in the provision of original planning studies for areawide problems, such as air and
stream pollution control.
1969]
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
represented on the Council by the county government. Such an
organization might even retard the multiplication of incorporations by
removing some of the incentives for individual community action.
(c) Transfer of Functions to County Governments. -This
approach involves a general transformation of the county government
from a mere local functioning division of the state government to a
more municipal form of government which provides governmental
(municipal) services much like any city. There are several advantages
to this form of coordination. The coordination efforts can take
advantage of an existing governmental structure, thereby eliminating
the need for formation of a new structure for coordination effect. The
transfer can be effected with minimum alteration of existing
geographical boundaries of other jurisdictions and can provide a good
base for planning and operational coordination. When governmental
functions are transferred to the county, subsequent county actions
have the force of law, rather than a mere agreement or voluntary
association of municipalities. However, a county system is not
particularly useful in those metropolitan areas which encompass more
than one county 2 Further, county governments, originally set up to
perform only state functions in a rurally based system, are generally
not equipped to provide urban services. Finally, only those services
and functions which are transferred can be coordinated, and to the
extent that constituent municipalities retain their own functions,
coordination cannot be complete.
COGs are different from county-transfers mostly in scope and in
legal effect of proposals. Urban counties are preferable to the extent
they can enforce coordination. COGs are preferable to the extent
they provide a forum for cooperation on all functions performed
within the entire metropolitan region, rather than merely for some
services in a one-county area.
(d) Transfer of Functions to State Governments.-This
approach to fragmentation usually involves the transfer of certain
aspects of a metropolitan function to the state, such as provision of a
trunk line for water supply by the state, with actual distribution by
local units.- Of course this approach is itself only fragmentary, as it
attacks only a small part of the total problem. Moreover, such
transfer has been eschewed as an abdication by municipalities, and it
seems to be generally accepted that local functions should be carried
on at the local, rather than the state level.
22. This includes about one-third of our metropolitan areas. ACIR. ALTERNATIVES 44.
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(e) Limited-Purpose Special Service Districts.-The ACIR
defines a limited purpose district as a separate unit of government set
up to perform one or a few urban functions throughout part or all of
the metropolitan area, including the central city.n Such districts are
usually established by state law without a referendum, and they
usually supply services rather than perform regulatory functions.
Members are generally appointed, either by the state governor or by
governing bodies of municipalities of the area to be served. Activities
are generally financed by service charges.
Advantages of this form include: high political feasibility, since
no voter approval is required and the effect upon existing
governmental units is minimal; easy formation by legislative act
rather than constitutional amendment; and broad coverage of the
entire metropolitan region even when it spreads beyond a single
county. However, creation of another unit of government to serve
only a single or limited function complicates the existing
governmental morass. When several different special districts are set
up and authority is progressively diffused, the possibility of
overlapping and duplication of efforts is increased. Because of its
method of composition, it is remote from the voters. Thus, creation of
special purpose districts for limited functions can easily add to the
coordination problem.
It is difficult to compare a limited special purpose district with a
COG, except to point out that a COG can probably achieve the same
advantages without similar drawbacks. From _he standpoint of legal
acrobatics, the COG is more easily constituted, being merely a forum
for consultation and agreement. The COG is areawide in scope, does
not impose -an additional governmental unit, can provide similar
coordination of services and is not restricted to a limited number of
special services for the metropolitan area.
(f) Multipurpose Districts.-As the name implies, the
multipurpose district performs more functions than a limited purpose
district and therefore usually requires voter approval for its
formation. This requirement brings the performance of functions
closer to the electorate but makes the multipurpose district somewhat
less politically feasible. Since it constitutes more of a threat to other
general local governments (being more general in nature itself), it is
likely to be less acceptable to competing local governments. However,
by performing many functions, it forestalls creation of several limited
23. ACIR, ALTERNATIVES 49.
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purpose districts, and it retains local control over local matters while
treating areawide problems on an areawide basis.
The effects of a multipurpose district are similar to those of a
COG. Since the multipurpose district is itself a government, there is
no question as to its enforcement powers as there is with the
voluntary COG. However, a COG can be more easily formed, does
not require voter approval, and does not provide the competition
(potential and real) for existing units of local government. Thus, a
COG may be more politically feasible but less governmentally
effective than a multipurpose district.
(g) Annexation.-This form involves the complete absorption
of territory by a municipality and may be carried out by any of the
following methods: legislative action extending municipal boundaries;
popular vote of the annexing city, the annexed territory, or both;
unilateral action by the municipality; judicial fiat upon petition by
affected citizens or municipalities; or determination by a commission
or board.24 Because annexation is usually limited to unincorporated
territory, it cannot meet the prime reason for seeking metropolitan
cooperation-avoidance of piecemeal approaches to metropolitan-wide
problems. Moreover, a COG does not confront the voter-approval
problems inherent in many annexation procedural requirements.
(h) Consolidation.-Consolidation is the joining together of
two or more units of government of approximately equal stature into
a single governmental unit. Consolidation is usually voluntary,
requiring petition for and voting upon the consolidation in the units to
be merged. The effect is to produce a different city, with general
municipal powers. If we are to idolize the effective coordination of
governmental functions for a metropolitan area, the consolidation
route seems preferable to any of the other forms considered. However,
the Nashville experience indicates the extreme difficulty of such a
move, even for an area with relatively few constituent municipalities.
Consolidation is complicated by the large number of governmental
units to be consolidated, increased popular resistance as the relative
sizes of the central city and the outlying municipalities increase, and
the interstate characteristics of some metropolitan areas. These factors
indicate that the consolidation solution to fragmentation is not
presently realistic in most of our metropolitan areas. It must be
emphasized that this is definitely not to say that consolidation should
be abandoned where the obstacles seem insurmountable. But it does
24. Id. at 58.
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suggest that an alternative approach should be available so that all is
not lost in the struggle for an ideal form. In fact, it is precisely this
apparent impasse which suggests that the COG approach may be
extremely useful. By initiating areawide approaches to regional
problems, the COG can pave the way for increasing cooperation
among governmental units, and if fate directs eventual consolidation,
such consolidation could be facilitated by present efforts at
coordination. This valuable function of the COG concept is illustrated
by the impression among some observers that as the COG matures
and gains experience in areawide problem solving, there tends to be
less friction for areawide programs, even within the voluntary
organization.2
(i) City-County Consolidation.-This approach is essentially
the same as the consolidation noted above, except that here the
consolidation involves different levels of government. The legal
procedure for such consolidation may be different from that for inter-
municipal consolidation, but the effect is essentially the same. Since it
encompasses only a single county, this type of consolidation may be
more limited in usefulness than a general consolidation, but there will
be more universal influence of the resultant unit on the area than in a
random consolidation of cities.
6) Federation.-This type of organization involves creation
of a two-level government in a metropolitan area, one for areawide
problems and services in which the still-existing constituent
municipalities participate jointly, and one for the performance of local
functions and services by the constituent municipalities.! Federation
seems to provide the sought-after objective of thinking big on larger
problems while leaving local government in charge of other matters.
For this reason it is probably more politically feasible than
consolidation. But since it encroaches upon existing local functions, it
is probably less politically feasible than would be a piecemeal
assumption of functions by a county government. There is also the
problem of determining the appropriate distribution of powers and
25. Although all COG officials contacted strongly indicated that their organizations were
not, and did not intend to become, "super-governments," all were encouraged by an apparent
increasing acceptance of COG recommendations among the members. The forum-for-agreement
approach was invariably emphasized, usually with the hope that COG influence would continue
to increase, not in the consolidation-type governmental sense, but merely in the voluntary
cooperation of members in the solution of serious areawide problems. In no case did a
correspondent indicate or even intimate that he had any designs on consolidation.
26. See Rose, A Decade of Metropolitan Government in Toronto. 13 BUFFALO L. REV.
539 (1964).
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functions between local units and the central government. Since the
federation approach is relatively new in this country, it is likely that it
would require constitutional amendment. Finally, the federation would
be a new governmental unit and would require major reformation of
existing structures.
A federation is similar to consolidation in its comparison to the
COG. If the desired result of coordination efforts is some sort of
eventual consolidation effect, a reasonable approach might be to set
up a COG, followed in the future by a federation in which the local
units retain at least some of their governmental functions, and
culminating eventually in complete consolidation.
B. Subject Matter of COG A ctivities
The structure and essential nature of a Council of Governments
are applied by COG representatives to types of processes which can be
classified into three categories: (1) promotion of intergovernmental
communication; (2) preparation of special studies; and (3) actual
performance of municipal functions.
1. Intergovernmental Communication.- Initially, the COG
concept is geared to provide a forum for discussion of problems
shared by governmental units in a metropolitan area. One COG
official has observed that the most important function of his COG to
date has been to bring together the heads of area governments for
consultation on area problems'
Another useful form of intergovernmental communication is
COG sponsorship of seminars for member government officials. The
Metropolitan Atlanta Council of Local Governments (MACLOG) has
held three such seminars in connection with its program for
coordination of law enforcement activities in the Atlanta area. The
North Central Texas Council of Governments (NCT COG- Dallas-
Fort Worth) has held seminars in conjunction with local universities
on a "Systems Approach to the Development of the North Central
Texas Urban Region" and on the impact of a regional airport on
small towns. 9
27. Letter from Wallace Altes, Administrative Assistant to the Executive Director, East-
\Vest Gateway Coordinating Council (St. Louis), to Louis F. Comus, Jr., Jan. 16, 1969.
28. Subjects of these seminars included "Safe Burglary Investigation," "Auto Theft"
Year 1969 (Nov: 16, 1967); Mid-Willamette Valley Council of Governments. "Statement of
METROPOLITAN ATLANTA COUNCIL OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, ANNUAL REP. [hereinafter cited
as 1967 MACLOG ANNUAL REP.].
29. NCT COG, Your Region in Action (March, 1968).
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2. Special Studies.-A prime function of all COGs surveyed is
the conduct of special studies of problems and the presentation of
proposals for their solutions in the metropolitan areas
involved. Studies on air pollution have been or will be undertaken by
the Regional Council of Elected Officials (RCEO-Philadelphia), the
Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG-San Francisco), the
Mid-Cumberland Council of Governments (MC-COG-Nashville),
the East-West Gateway Coordinating Council (E-WGCC-St. Louis),
the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
(MWCOG-Washfngton, D.C.), and the Southeast Michigan Council
of Governments (SEMCOG-Detroit). The St. Louis study resulted
in the drafting of a Model Air Pollution Control Ordinance for the
area3 Regional transportation problems have been the subject of
extensive study by the Puget Sound Governmental Conference
(PSGC-Seattle) and by the Philadelphia, San Francisco and
Washington Councils, and such studies are scheduled in the future by
the Nashville and Detroit councils. Other subjects of special studies
include county planning commission procedures and platting
procedures in Seattle; solid waste disposal programs by the Mid-
Willamette Valley Council of Governments (M-WVCOG-Salem,
Oregon) and in the Atlanta, Dallas-Fort Worth, Detroit and St. Louis
councils; cooperation in dealing with civil disorders in Nashvillle; and
gun control programs in Washington.
3. Active Participation Programs.-Some COGs have
undertaken more active programs in their areas. The Salem council
coordinates the public capital improvement programs of its members.
The San Francisco council has been designated the official planning
agency for that region. In the Atlanta area, the council has set up
METROPOL, a regional police coordination agency, and the Dallas-
Fort Worth council has established a police academy to provide
uniform training for its member government police forces. The St.
Louis council has begun training minority group members in the
planning profession. The Washington council, which does most of the
regional transportation planning for that area, is preparing an area-
wide model building code, working on development of a computerized
health and welfare register, and-has developed a "hot-line" system of
communication among the region's public safety agencies .3 Although
30. Letter, supra note 27.
31. The lists in this section of active or proposed studies were drawn from the following
sources: COMMITTEE OF ONE HUNDRED, A PROPOSAL FOR A 'VOLUNTARY COUNCIL OF
GOVERNMENTS IN SOUTHEAST MICHIGAN (1966); 1967 MACLOG ANNUAL REP. supra note 28;
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these examples are only representative of the varied functions of COGs
around the country, they do indicate the potential value of the COG
concept in some of our larger metropolitan regions.
C. Analysis of the COG Process
Having set forth some examples of the types of functions
performed by COGs, it is now necessary to determine the abstract
nature of these functions-that is, whether COG functions and
processes are classified administrative or legislative in nature.
The legislative function is generally considered one of policy
formulation, or the "establishment of permanent rules for the
government of the municipality. ' 32 Needless to say, policies
formulated by municipalities in their legislative capacity, absent some
overriding statutory or constitutional objection, will have the force of
law. The administrative function, on the other hand, involves carrying
out the dictates of a previously formulated legislative policy. The
administrative functions usually involve filling in details in the
legislative scheme to effectuate the legislative policy as determined and
promulgated by the municipal council. With these rather vague
outlines of the differentiation between the legislative and
administrative functions, a distinction which often becomes blurred in
municipal government, let us now analyze some of the COG processes
listed above.
The intergovernmental communication functions, including
provision of a forum for discussion of area-wide problems and
sponsorship of seminars for member officials, would seem to be
neither legislative nor administrative since there is neither a policy-
formulation nor a policy-implementation function involved. Similarly,
the conducting of special studies, which may result in unenforceable
recommendations, would seem to be outside the scope of the
METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS HERE, Now ... AND ToOORROW
(1968-1969); Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, Proposed Budget for Fiscal
Year 1969 (Nov. 16, 1967); Mid-Willamette Valley Council of Governments. "Statement of
Agency Programs" (December 10, 1968); NORTH CENTRAL TEXAS COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS,
A PROGRAM OF ACTION FOR THE NORTH CENTRAL TEXAS REGION-PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
(June, 1967); NORTH CENTRAL TEXAS COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS, STATE OF THE REGION
REPORT (1968); PUGET SOUND GOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE, PUGET SOUND GOVERNMENTAL
CONFERENCE-A DESCRIPTION (January, 1968); Letter, supra note 27; Letter from Wayne
Moore," Jr., Coordinator, MACLOG, April 22, 1968; Letter from Robert R. Weaver, Admin.
Asst. NCT COG, January 29, 1969; Interview with Frank Ziegler, Mid-Cumberland Council of
Governments, April 25, 1968.
32. 37 AM. JR. Municipal Corporations § 52 (1941).
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legislative-administrative distinction. However, activities involving
actual participation by the COG may fall within the legislative sphere.
Of course, if some other body must act before a planning function
becomes a positive rule for the area, it is clearly outside the scope of
the distinction. But if the COG plan, as finally adopted by the
Council, is the official policy for the area without further action by
constituent members, the COG would seem to be performing a
legislative function.
It has been suggested that the requirement of the Model Cities
Act that a COG-type organization review and approve local applications
for federal grants might impart illegal authority to the COGs, which
are non-elected and non-representative. 3 This might be so if the
authority so bestowed upon the COGs is deemed to be legislative in
character. However, a close reading of the Model Cities provision for
COG review of grant applications suggests that even here the COG is
merely functioning administratively. The Act provides that:
[E]ach application shall be accompanied (A) by the comments and
recommendations with respect to the project involved by the areawide agency and
governing bodies of the units of general local government to which the
application has been submitted for review, and '(B) by a statement by the
applicant that such comments and recommendations have been considered prior
to formal submission of the application. Such comments shall include
information concerning the extent to which the project is consistent with
comprehensive planning developed or in the process of development for the
metropolitan area or the unit of general local government . . . and the extent to
which such project contributes to the fulfillment of such planning. The comments
and recommendations and the statement referred to in this paragraph shall...
be reviewed by the agency of the Federal Government to which such application is
submitted for the sole purpose of assisting it in determining whether the
application is in accordance with the provisions of federal law which govern the
making of the loans or grants.Y
It could be argued that in its review of the application, the COG is
merely performing an administrative function-that of matching the
application against the general plan for the area in order to determine
whether it fits. It is the federal agency which actually makes the
decision as to whether to grant the funds. The language of the Act
suggests that the COG's recommendations are to be only one factor
in this determination. Thus, in the review itself, the COG is merely
interpreting policy rather than making it. On the other hand, since the
COG itself formulated the plan which now takes on the force of
33. Lecture by Professor Stason, Urban Development Seminar, Vanderbilt University
School of Law, April 17, 1968.
34. Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 § 204, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3334(b) (Supp. 1967).
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policy, it can be argued that the total effect of the COG action is policy-
making in nature.
Here a distinction must be made between two different levels of
policy. One level is the COG policy to develop the metropolitan area
in accordance with a specified plan promulgated by the COG. This
policy is not self-enforcing and would probably not be considered
a legislative function. The second level is a federal policy not to grant
funds for projects which do not conform to a plan for orderly
development of the whole metropolitan area. The statute does not
require agencies to deny funds to applicants which do not conform to
the area COG plan, but only makes such non-conformance one factor
to be considered. The statutory language leaves room for approval of
applications by the federal agency, even though the application
deviates somewhat from the area plan. The scope of permissible
deviation is left up to the agency involved, and presumably the
applicant could, in its statement under part (B) of the statute, indicate
that it had considered the COG report and recommendations and
found them inappropriate for given reasons. All this is to say that
even the application-review function of COGs under the Model Cities
Act is, at least arguably, only administrative.
Finally, it is possible under the federal grant program for COGs
to undertake the provision of various areawide services for member
municipalities. This would clearly be an administrative function
performed by the COG, with the municipalities maintaining control,
at least ostensibly, over the types of services to be bought and the
amount of service to be supplied by the COG.
III. COGs AND "ONE MAN, ONE VOTE"
A. Application of "One Man, One Vote" to Local
Government- The Cases
In two recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has been
faced with the question of the applicability of the "one man, one
vote" principle to local governmental bodies. The circumstances of
these cases and the language of the Court must be examined in order
to determine whether it is probable that "one man, one vote" will be
applied to COGs.
In Sailors v. Board of Education,35 Kent County, Michigan,
contained several local school boards elected from their respective
35. 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
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municipalities. Each local school board selected a delegate to sit with
other similarly selected delegates from other local boards to select the
county school board. Functions of the county board included
selection of a county school superintendent, preparation of its annual
budget and levy of taxes to meet the budget, furnishing of consulting
or supervisory services to local school districts upon request, conduct
of teacher cooperative education classes, employment of teachers for
special education programs, and power to transfer areas from one
district to another. The Court held that although populations of the
local districts were far from equal, giving highly populated and
sparsely populated districts the same vote in selecting the county
board, the system does not violate the "one man, one vote" principle,
since the county school board is essentially administrative rather than
legislative in nature and membership is appointive, not elective.
The legislative-administrative distinction as applied by the Court
is not consistent with the distinction developed in this article. While
selection of the county superintendent, the conduct of special classes
for teachers, and the furnishing of services upon request would seem
to be clearly administrative, the preparation of the county school
board budget, the levy of taxes and the power to transfer areas from
one local district to another would seem equally clearly to be
legislative. However, the Court found all these functions not to be
legislative "in the classical sense."
3
The multi-tiered process by which board members are selected
was found to be appointive rather than elective. The Court noted that
delegates who chose the county board did not purport to represent their
electorates and did not have any means of determining what their
electorates wished in county board selection. Since no general election
was provided for in selecting the county board, the board could not be
malapportioned under the "one man, one vote" principle 7
More recently, in A very v. Midland County,38 the Court held that
the Midland County (Texas) Commissioners Court was
malapportioned. Four of the court members were elected, each from a
district within the county. Since representation from four districts was
quite obviously malapportioned, the Supreme Court was asked to
36. Id. at 110. Unfortunately, the Court did not attempt to define what it means by
"legislative in the classical sense."
37. It should be noted that this factor clearly distinguishes Sailors from other earlier lower
court decisions. In the earlier cases, the body which was required to be reapportioned was chosen
directly by the voters of the governmental unit involved. See cases cited in notes 42 & 43 infra.
38. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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determine whether the functions performed by the Commissioners
Court were essentially "legislative" or "administrative"pursuant to
the test under Sailors.9 Curiously, the Court seemed to disregard the
legislative-administrative test and held that the Commissioners Court
was unconstitutionally malapportioned, reasoning that:
[T]he court does have power to make a larger number of decisions having a
broad range of impacts on all the citizens of the county. It sets a tax rate,
equalizes assessments, and issues bonds. It then prepares and adopts a budget for
allocating the county's funds, and is given by statute a wide range of discretion
in choosing the subjects on which to spend. In adopting the budget the court
makes both long-term judgments about the way Midland County should
develop-whether industry should be solicited, roads improved, recreation
facilities built, and land set aside for schools-and immediate choices among
competing needs?4
The Court expressly limited its opinion as follows:
We hold today only that the Constitution permits no substantial variation from
equal population in drawing districts for units of local government having
general governmental powers over the entire geographic area served by the
body!'
The test now seems to be drifting away from the legislative-
administrative distinction toward one which involves the extent to
which the governmental body affects all the citizens in the area.
The lower federal courts and the state courts have had little
opportunity to define further the distinctions in Sailors or the broader
test of Avery. Most of the earlier cases dealt with governmental
bodies which are clearly legislative, such as city councils and county
boards of supervisors.12 Moreover, in a recent decision, a federal
district court in Tennessee anticipated the Avery decision to some
extent by noting that the legislative-administrative distinction is not
particularly helpful, thereafter applying "one man, one vote" to a
county school board4 3
39. The Texas Supreme Court, in finding the Commissioners Court unconstitutionally
malapportioned, had determined that the "legislative" functions of the body were "negligible".
Id. at 483.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 484-85.
42. Ellis v. Mayor, 352 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1965) (city council); Miller v. Board of
Supervisors, 63 Cal. 2d 343, 405 P.2d 857 (1965) (county board); Hanlon v. Towey, 274 Minn.
187, 142 N.W.2d 741 (1966) (county board); Seaman v. Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d 94, 209 N.E.2d
778, 262 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1965) (city council); State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43,
132 N.W.2d 249 (1965) (county board).
43. Strickland v. Burns, 256 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
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B. COGs and the Present State of the Law
The obvious question now becomes whether "one man, one vote"
applies to COGs. Extrapolating from the Sailors case, it appears that
it will not. As to the legislative-administrative distinction, to the
extent that various COG processes are "clearly administrative," there
will be no trouble with "one man, one vote," even though the COGs
do not remotely approach proportional representation. But what is
"clearly administrative" under the Sailors holding? An investigation
of the functions of the county school board in Sailors presents a
striking similarlity to the functions of most COGs. The COGs select
the administrative head of the organization's staff; they approve the
COG budget; they provide special services to members; and they
facilitate intermunicipal communication. The only COG activities
which were even arguably legislative were the planning functions
which appear to have the force of law and the review of federal
grants. These two characteristics certainly do not seem to be as
obviously legislative as the levy of taxes and the transfer of areas
among local boards in Sailors. Thus, there is no reason to believe that
the Supreme Court would any more readily apply "one man, one
vote" to COGs than to the Kent County School Board, especially
since COGs are completely voluntary and generally perform only
advisory functions.
Moreover, the method of designating members of COGs is quite
similar to the process for selecting the county school board in
Sailors-the latter being quite obviously appointive rather than
elective in the view of the Supreme Court. Thus under this argument,
the COG still seems immune to the "one man, one vote" principle.
However, the addition of the Avery decision requires a
reappraisal of the question. On the face of the Avery case, the
apparent immunity should not be disturbed. The functions of the
Commissioners Court were clearly "legislative" and would thus have
been subject to "one man, one vote" even under Sailors. The Court in
A very took note of the commentary in the official version of the Texas
statutes, to the effect that the Commissioners Court is "the general
governing body of the county." This would readily explain the
language quoted above from the Court's dictum. Adding to this the
Court's express limitation of its own holding, we might conclude that
COGs will maintain their exemption from "one man, one vote".
.However, the Court's dictum is disquieting, since the nearer we
approach a test based upon all-inclusiveness of traditional municipal
funnctions performed by the body involved, the nearer we come to
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applying "one man, one vote" to COGs. If the Sailors legislative-
administrative and appointive-elective tests are to be discarded in
favor of the broader and even more subjective test in A very, there is
an increased possibility that COGs will be affected.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The Council of Governments concept can be a viable approach to
the solution of metropolitan problems arising from governmental
fragmentation. It has the advantage of being able to cope with
problems on a truly area-wide basis since its only boundaries are the
interests of the constituent municipalities in a metropolitan region. It
appears to be politically quite feasible since it does not seriously
threaten existing governments in the region. Even though membership
is completely voluntary, the influence of the COG has been increased
by federal assistance in the form of grants to the COG itself for
services to member units and -by the COGs effect upon the granting of
federal funds to constituent units for individual projects. In fact, the
potential contributions of COGs to the morass of metropolitan
problems is so encouraging that a word of caution is well taken:
I feel that the greatest danger to a Council is the assumption, after one is
formulated, that intergovernmental problems have somehow been taken care of
and local elected officials need not be as concerned with it.
Moreover, it appears that if the Supreme Court does not decide
to extend Sailors and Avery significantly, COGs will be immune from
"one man, one vote" difficulties, at least as they are presently
constituted. COG proponents should find encouragement in dictum of
the Court in Avery which might be seen as directed to the COG
concept:
the Constitution and this Court are not roadblocks in the path of innovation,
experiment, and development among units of local government. We will not bar
. . . 'the emergence of a new ideology and structure of public bodies, equipped
with new capacities and motivations' 5
44. Letter from Wesley M. Howe, Executive Secretary, Mid-Willamette Valley Council of
Governments, January 24, 1969.
45. 390 U.S. at 485. This language of the Court is even more encouraging than words of
similar import and direction expressed in Sailors. 387 U.S. at 110-11.
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